If Kidnapping Presidents Becomes Acceptable, the Rules Are Finished

This article is written in response to claims that cross-border military force may be justified by  domestic criminal indictments or disputed elections. Such arguments, if left unchallenged, risk  normalising a dangerous erosion of the UN Charter’s authority at a moment when conflicts in  Ukraine and rising tensions around Taiwan already place the international system under  severe strain. The purpose of this piece is not to defend any government, but to defend the legal  framework that protects all states from coercion by the powerful. 

There is one rule that prevents the world from sliding into permanent instability: states may  not use force to settle political disputes. That rule sits at the heart of the United Nations  Charter, drafted after two world wars to stop power, not principle, from deciding who governs  whom. 

“If a powerful state can seize a foreign president by force, sovereignty becomes  conditional.” 

Reports that the United States used force inside Venezuela to seize a sitting president,  defended by references to criminal charges, electoral illegitimacy, and “law enforcement”,  strike directly at that rule. These are not technical legal debates. Under international law,  these justifications do not work. 

“Domestic indictments do not internationalise jurisdiction. Elections disputes do not  suspend sovereignty.” 

If the world treats this moment as normal, the damage will not stop in Caracas. It will reach  Kyiv. And it will reach Taipei. 

The law is strict and intentionally so 

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter bans the use of force against another state. There are only two  exceptions: 

1. Explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council. 
2. Self-defence under Article 51 in response to an armed attack. 

That is the entire list. 

There is no exception for domestic criminal indictments. 

There is no exception for disputed elections. 

There is no exception for leaders deemed corrupt or authoritarian. 

As Corten (2012) demonstrates, the prohibition on the use of force remains legally intact even  as selective state(s) practice erodes compliance in reality. The International Court of Justice 

confirmed this baseline in Nicaragua v United States (1986), holding that even limited military  action breaches the UN Charter when no recognised justification exists. 

“Political frustration does not create legal permission.” 

Illegitimacy does not cancel sovereignty 

Supporters of the action argue that Venezuela’s president lost an election or retained power  through military support. Even if that were accepted as fact, it does not change the law. 

International law protects states, not the moral standing of their governments. Recognition  affects diplomacy, who embassies engage with and who signs treaties, but it does not  authorise the use of force. Talmon (1998) shows that claims of illegitimacy have never created  a lawful right of intervention under international law. 

“International law protects states, not governments’ reputations.” 

There is no doctrine of democracy enforcement in the UN Charter. That idea was deliberately  rejected after 1945 because it invites permanent intervention by powerful states against  weaker ones. 

If electoral illegitimacy justified force, sovereignty would become conditional, granted only to  governments approved by the strong. 

Leader capture by force breaks a second legal wall 

Even where serious criminal allegations exist, international law draws a bright line. A sitting  head of state enjoys personal immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction while in office. The  International Court of Justice confirmed this unequivocally in Arrest Warrant (DRC v Belgium). 

More importantly, even international criminal law rejects unilateral enforcement. Akande  (2003) explains that accountability depends on institutional cooperation, courts, warrants,  and state consent, not cross-border abduction by military force. 

“Even the gravest crimes are prosecuted through institutions, not invasions.” 

If even the prosecution of atrocity crimes relies on cooperation rather than coercion, drug  trafficking allegations or electoral disputes cannot justify armed seizure. 

The real danger is turning war into policing 

The most dangerous development is not only the use of force. It is the rebranding of force as  “law enforcement”. 

Policing operates within a shared legal system. Armies do not. When armies begin enforcing  domestic criminal law abroad, sovereignty becomes conditional, dependent on who has the  power to indict. That logic travels.

“This is how norms collapse: not by rewriting the law, but by eroding its authority.” 

Russia already claims Ukraine’s leadership is illegal and criminal. Once  criminality and illegitimacy are accepted rhetorically as gateways to coercion, resistance  weakens. Allies hedge. Neutral states abstain. Enforcement fractures. 

Why Ukraine and Taiwan pay first 

Nothing here legalises aggression. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains a manifest violation of the Charter. Any attempt to seize Volodymyr Zelenskyy would compound that illegality.

But international law is enforced by coalitions, not judgments alone. 

“Selective enforcement today becomes strategic vulnerability tomorrow.” 

Ukraine depends on global unity to resist conquest. Taiwan depends on consistent norms to  deter coercion. When leading states bend the rules, they weaken their own ability to mobilise  others. Sanctions lose force. Deterrence becomes more expensive. The burden shifts to those  already under threat. 

What the global response must be 

If the rules based order is to survive, the response must be collective and clear. 

First, restate the law without euphemism. 

Force is unlawful without UN authorisation or self-defence. Criminal charges and legitimacy  claims do not justify military action. 

Second, use multilateral forums even when politics blocks outcomes. Security Council paralysis is not permission. The General Assembly exists to reaffirm the law  when power intervenes. 

Third, separate justice from war. 

If leaders face credible allegations, the lawful routes are courts, extradition, and international  tribunals, not soldiers. 

Fourth, avoid complicity. 

States should review military and intelligence cooperation that could support unlawful force.  Principles matter only when conduct follows them. 

A simple choice 

International law does not fail because it is violated once. It fails when its authority is eroded  by selective enforcement. If kidnapping presidents becomes acceptable when done by the powerful, sovereignty becomes meaningless. And when sovereignty becomes meaningless,  no country, large or small, is safe. 

The world must choose: rules, or the hollowing out of the rules-based order and international  norms. 

* Sherwyn Sean Cupido-Weaich is a legal and governance professional and researcher with an academic background in law and business. He holds a BA (Hons) in Business and Law (UK) and is completing an Executive MBA in Data Analytics (UK). He has published peer-reviewed research on economic justice and development and is currently engaged in  research at the intersection of constitutional governance, data, and public-sector transformation. 

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.